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10	UNITED STATES	S DISTRICT COURT
11	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CA	LIFORNIA, SAN JOSE DIVISION
12		
13	IN RE: HIGH-TECH EMPLOYEE ANTITRUST LITIGATION	Master Docket No. 11-CV-2509-LHK
14	AUTITION EITIONION	EXHIBIT 9 TO DECLARATION OF
15	THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:	LIN W. KAHN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
<ul><li>16</li><li>17</li></ul>	ALL ACTIONS	PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
18		[REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION]
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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3	SAN JOSE DIVISION
4	
5	
6	IN RE: HIGH-TECH EMPLOYEE )
7	ANTITRUST LITIGATION )
8	) No. 11-CV-2509-LHK
9	THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: )
10	ALL ACTIONS.
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14	ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY
15	VIDEO DEPOSITION OF ROSEMARY ARRIADA-KEIPER
16	March 28, 2013
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19	REPORTED BY: GINA V. CARBONE, CSR NO. 8249, RPR, CCRR
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that we're going to need to budget in terms of the focal review process.

So after we've gone through our exercise and we see kind of from a market perspective where our ranges are lining up, we'll engage in a conversation with the finance organization to say, you know, this is what we believe we need.

They'll come back to us and say, well, this is what we can financially afford to give you, and we end up coming to a compromise. And sometimes we get what we need, and other times they've come back and said, you know what, we can't afford to do that, and this is what we can give you.

- Q. So when you say that you -- and what you get back from the finance organization is a budget for increasing salaries at the focal review time?
- A. Exactly. Exactly. So the ranges automatically -- I shouldn't say automatically. We adjust the ranges. So if they've gone up or down, those get adjusted. What the focal does is determine, you know, based on budgets that managers will have, whether individuals -- how much individuals can get adjusted.

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Excuse me. Can you avoid of touching the cable.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I do a lot with my

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09:35:49 1	hands. I'll try to keep them up here.
09:35:52 2	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: It makes a noise
09:35:53 3	THE WITNESS: I use my hands a lot.
09:35:57 4	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. And what if you review
09:35:59 5	Adobe salaries against the survey data and find that
09:36:05 6	Adobe that the midpoint of Adobe salary ranges is
09:36:10 7	higher?
09:36:10 8	A. We'll adjust them down.
09:36:12 9	Q. Do you adjust salary ranges down?
09:36:13 10	A. Yeah.
09:36:21 11	Q. Is it Adobe's practice not to adjust actual
09:36:23 12	salaries themselves down if the ranges go down?
09:36:28 13	A. Correct. Like an individual's salary? Is that
09:36:31 14	what you are referencing? Yeah.
09:36:33 15	Q. So if the salary range goes down, individual
09:36:36 16	salaries do not go down?
09:36:37 17	A. No. But the position within the range changes,
09:36:39 18	right?
09:36:44 19	Q. I guess everyone would be slightly higher in
09:36:46 20	the range if the salary goes down?
09:36:48 21	A. Exactly.
09:36:49 22	Q. That's about all the math I can do right there.
09:36:51 23	A. That's good. That's really good.
09:36:54 24	Q. And if the ranges go up, do salaries increase?
09:36:57 25	A. No.

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- How do --Q.
- Their position now changes lower into the Α. range.
- Q. Does Adobe ever bring individuals whose base salaries are lower than the low end of their salary range up to minimum as part of the focal process?
- So, yeah. Each range has a minimum and a maximum. If folks are below the minimum of the range, we will typically red flag them. That, to us, you know, can mean a number of things. It can mean that the market has moved significantly and we haven't been able to keep up from an individual perspective. Sometimes it's a skill gap issue.

So, you know, our practice has been is, is we will adjust them to the minimum as part of the annual review, they get red flagged, and then we have a conversation with the manager to say, you know, we have a minimum for a reason because we believe you need to be in this range to be competitive. You know, is there any reasons why you might not want to adjust. And so it becomes manager's discretion in terms of whether they want to do that.

And sometimes they have legitimate reasons for why. You know, certainly as you start to get into less mature markets, like outside of the U.S., there is a lot

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09:38:23 1 more volatility, so, you know, managers will come to us
09:38:26 2 and say you know what, we don't need to be paying this.
09:38:28 3 We can kind of get them for not this amount. This is
09:38:30 4 not what's driving them. So there is a number of
09:38:33 5 factors, but yeah. It ultimately is manager's
09:38:36 6 discretion.

- Q. As a compensation analyst, did you ever study whether employees were -- how many employees were being paid below the range for their job?
- A. It's part of the reporting. So we'll look at how many employees are below the minimum, we'll look at how many are above the maximum, we'll look at how many are targeted, you know, in what percentile. So, yeah, we definitely look at that information.
- Q. Has that been true for -- if I use the term "class period," do you understand what I would be -- what I'm referring to?
  - A. No.
- Q. So the class period -- and we'll talk about your declaration a little bit later.
  - A. Okay.
- Q. But when I refer to the class period, I'm talking about the period of time between January 1st, 2005 and December 31st, 2009.
  - A. Okay.

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09:39:31 1	Q. So do you know whether for the entire for
09:39:34 2	the entire class period it's been Adobe's policy to
09:39:41 3	review whether employees are being paid in or out of
09:39:44 4	range?
09:39:45 5	A. So yeah. So it's always been a part of the
09:39:48 6	process to kind of look at where employees are
09:39:50 7	positioned relative to the ranges that we're developing.
09:39:57 8	Q. And has this process of and has Adobe
09:40:01 9	participated in surveys for the whole class period?
09:40:04 10	A. As long as I can remember, yeah.
09:40:06 11	Q. And has Adobe engaged in this annual process of
09:40:09 12	comparing its salaries to market on an annual basis
09:40:12 13	A. Yes.
09:40:12 14	Q throughout the class period?
09:40:13 15	A. Yeah.
09:40:23 16	(Discussion off the record.)
09:40:33 17	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. So we were talking about
09:40:34 18	your job duties as a compensation analyst, and you
09:40:36 19	mentioned surveys, benchmarking, analysis. And was
09:40:41 20	the analysis that we just discussed the analysis
09:40:44 21	that you were talking about when you referred to
09:40:48 22	doing analysis as a compensation analyst?
09:40:50 23	A. That's one of them.
09:40:51 24	Q. What other sorts of analyses did you do as a
09:40:54 25	compensation analyst?

10:46:11 Roughly? 1 Q. 10:46:12 Roughly about 12,000 globally. 2 Α. 10:46:18 3 Ο. Do you know how many of the roughly 12,000 jobs globally are in the United States? 10:46:21 4 10:46:25 5 Α. 12,000 employees. 10:46:26 6 Of the -- right. Do you know of the -- of 10:46:30 7 Adobe's roughly 12,000 employees, do you know how many reside in the United States? 10:46:33 8 10:46:34 9 A. Roughly 6,000. 10:46:40 10 Is it fair to say that throughout the class Q. 10:46:41 11 period, approximately half of Adobe's employees have 10:46:44 12 been located in the U.S.? 10:46:48 13 I don't know. Our distribution has shifted 10:46:51 14 over the years, so I don't know that it's always been 10:46:54 15 half. Okay. Do you know how many job categories 10:46:55 16 10:46:58 17 Adobe has currently? 10:47:03 18 Α. No. 10:47:10 19 Do you know whether there have been efforts Q. 10:47:12 20 over time to reduce or streamline Adobe's job categories? 10:47:16 21 10:47:18 22 We have tried to consolidate the number of jobs 10:47:21 23 we utilize, yes. Q. How so? 10:47:26 24 10:47:28 25 So as I mentioned earlier, every job has a

A.

discrete salary range, but there is not always a specific match in the market to a particular job. So in the past, we would create things that were called no-match jobs, and it was oftentimes because somebody might have like a hybrid role, right?

And so rather than, you know, creating all of these no-matches, we just said you know what, if there is a 70 percent match, just match it into this job. So it was in an effort to kind of reduce the number of jobs.

Q. Further down in paragraph 4 of Donna Morris' declaration, and I'm picking up just at the very last line of page 1, she states, "To help guide compensation decisions," now turning to page 2, "Adobe assigned each employee a job code (for example Code 3001079 for Senior Computer Scientist 2 Sw Dev), which has an associated job description, experience and education level."

Did I get that right?

- A. Yep.
- Q. What is the purpose -- or what purpose is served by helping to guide compensation decisions?
- A. What purpose is served? Kind of -- can you help me understand your question?
- Q. Well, why -- why does Adobe want to -- or why has Adobe wanted to help guide compensation decisions as

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10:49:33 10:49:38 2 10:49:43 3 10:49:47 10:49:50 5 10:49:55 6 10:49:59 7 10:50:01 8 10:50:13 9 10:50:15 10 10:50:20 11 10:50:21 12 10:50:24 13 10:50:27 14 10:50:30 15 10:50:35 16 10:50:38 17 10:50:42 18 10:50:46 19

Ms. Morris states in her declaration?

- A. So what we try to do is provide a range as a guide for employees to understand -- for managers to understand what a market value is for any particular job in the market. And it acts as a data point to help them make an informed decision around what the value of a particular job is, right?
- Q. Well, in what -- Ms. Morris states, "to help guide compensation decisions." I guess my question is, to help guide compensation decisions in what direction or --
- A. Probably in any direction. So as a manager we make decisions around new hires, we make decisions around annual review, we make decisions around promotions. And so, you know, a salary range, you know, helps you from the perspective of identifying kind of what the appropriate level of pay could be for a particular job.

You know, a job description helps in ensuring that you are kind of looking at the right kind of job and the right, you know, pay information as it relates to your job.

Q. So did -- or does Adobe assign each employee a job code -- well, let me back up.

Does each job code have a salary range

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10:51:51	11
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10:51:57	13
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associated with it?

- A. It does. Correct.
- Q. And so by assigning each employee a job code and a salary range, is Adobe trying to guide compensation decisions into the salary range?

MR. KIERNAN: Objection to form.

THE WITNESS: No. You know, I think what you do is you assign a job code to an employee. As managers are potentially looking at hiring somebody in, that range acts as a reference point to help guide them in terms of, you know, what they want to bring a person in.

Once they're in the company, that range kind of serves as a mechanism for people to understand kind of the value of a particular job from the perspective of the range -- or the perspective of the market. Where you fall within that range between the min and the maximum is based on, you know, your contributions as an employee. We have a, you know, pay for performance model at Adobe, and so, you know, where individuals are positioned within a range can fluctuate up or down based on their contributions.

MS. LEEBOVE: Q. Is the purpose of the salary ranges that are associated with job codes to guide managers to compensate employees within the salary range assigned to their job code?

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MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.

THE WITNESS: So the purpose of the range is really to act as, again, an indicator of what's the value of this particular job. And, you know, we educate around how you might use the breadth of a range when you are thinking about as a manager, how you might want to compensate somebody.

So again, based on their contributions, their skill set, whether they're new into a role versus somebody seasoned, you know, they can fluctuate all across that span of that range. So it's an indicator.

MS. LEEBOVE: Q. Does Adobe generally believe that employees should be paid within the salary range assigned to their job code?

A. It depends, right? They're case by case situations, but generally we have a range for a reason. We believe that in order to be competitive to the market, this is roughly the range that you need to be paying people in. And that kind of, you know, puts a check mark next to competitiveness.

However, again, where an individual is placed is dependent on a number of different factors. And so, you know, you will find examples of people that are not within the range.

Q. Does Adobe do any studies as to whether

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10:54:26 1	employees are being paid in or out of range?
10:54:29 2	A. We do. We not only look at those below, but we
10:54:33 3	look at those above, we look at people where they're
10:54:36 4	positioned within the actual range. So we do look at
10:54:40 5	that information.
10:54:49 6	Q. Is it the compensation analysts who look at
10:54:51 7	that information and make those determinations?
10:54:53 8	A. It is the compensation analyst that does that.
10:55:02 9	Q. Do the salary ranges associated with each job
10:55:06 10	code generally well, are they do they exist in
10:55:10 11	part to make compensation decisions more expedient?
10:55:15 12	A. I wouldn't say it's an expedient issue. It's
10:55:20 13	more of a, you know, what do we need to be targeting in
10:55:25 14	order to be competitive.
10:55:27 15	Q. What would happen if there were no salary
10:55:32 16	ranges associated with each job code? How would
10:55:35 17	compensation be determined then?
10:55:37 18	MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.
10:55:39 19	THE WITNESS: I don't know.
10:55:48 20	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. Did you say you didn't
10:55:49 21	know?
10:55:49 22	A. Yeah. Don't know.
10:55:53 23	Q. Continuing on with paragraph 4 of Ms. Morris'
10:55:58 24	declaration, the very last phrase in paragraph 4, which

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appears on page 2 says, "During the class period Adobe

10:56:07 1	used approximately unique job codes which have
10:56:10 2	changed over time." Do you see that?
10:56:14 3	A. Yeah.
10:56:15 4	Q. Is that true?
10:56:15 5	A. Yeah. Roughly.
10:56:20 6	Q. And how have the job codes changed over time?
10:56:24 7	A. I think we you can see fluctuations, right?
10:56:30 8	With the acquisition of new companies, you bring in some
10:56:34 9	new jobs, because sometimes we inherit talent that are
10:56:40 10	in roles that we may not have had previously. We add.
10:56:44 11	So as we expand into different geographies, you've got
10:56:48 12	to create job codes for, you know, roles in those
10:56:50 13	geographies. So we tend to see those numbers fluctuate
10:56:56 14	up or down. Or if we close offices or close a
10:56:59 15	particular geography, then you might see them go away.
10:57:04 16	Q. And has there been an effort within Adobe to
10:57:07 17	reduce the number of job codes Adobe uses for its
10:57:09 18	employees?
10:57:11 19	A. We have tried to consolidate, as I mentioned
10:57:13 20	earlier, with the no-match jobs.
10:57:22 21	Q. Do you know how many unique job codes Adobe
10:57:25 22	currently uses?
10:57:26 23	A. I don't.
10:57:29 24	Q. Do you know whether Adobe has tracked the

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number of job codes that have been in use throughout the

10:57:33 1	class period?
10:57:34 2	A. No.
10:57:35 3	Q. No, you don't know or no, they haven't tracked?
10:57:37 4	A. No, I don't know.
10:57:49 5	Q. Continuing on to paragraph 5 of Ms. Morris'
10:57:56 6	declaration. Is there anything in paragraph 5 that
10:57:59 7	you I want you to take a moment to review it. But if
10:58:04 8	you could let me know if there is anything that you
10:58:05 9	would change about that to better define Adobe's
10:58:11 10	compensation package.
10:58:24 11	A. I believe that's fair.
10:58:30 12	Q. Has it always well, throughout your tenure
10:58:37 13	at Adobe, has it been Adobe's policy to compensate
10:58:42 14	employees based on their performance and expected future
10:58:46 15	contribution?
10:58:46 16	A. It has.
10:58:51 17	Q. At any point in your tenure at Adobe, has Adobe
10:58:55 18	sought pay equality or parity among employees with the
10:58:59 19	same job code?
10:59:00 20	A. No.
10:59:08 21	Q. Throughout the class period, has Adobe believed
10:59:10 22	that differentiating compensation based on performance
10:59:15 23	increases employee satisfaction?

Α.

Q.

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Yeah, I don't know the answer to that.

As a compensation specialist at Adobe, do you

10:59:34 1	believe it's important to differentiate compensation
10:59:37 2	based on performance?
10:59:38 3	A. I do.
10:59:39 4	Q. Why?
10:59:39 5	A. I think people, you know, should be paid based
10:59:43 6	on the contributions that they make.
10:59:59 7	Q. How does Apple send a or Apple. I'm sorry.
11:00:02 8	Got my I'm completely conflating my defendants here.
11:00:07 9	How does Adobe send its employees clear
11:00:12 10	messages that they're not performing and that they have
11:00:15 11	to improve their performance?
11:00:17 12	A. Well, Adobe doesn't really do that. It's more
11:00:21 13	each manager, right? Managers have accountability for
11:00:25 14	the people they manage, and they're responsible for
11:00:27 15	assessing their performance and their contributions.
11:00:32 16	Q. What happens to underperforming employees at
11:00:35 17	Adobe?
11:00:39 18	MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.
11:00:40 19	THE WITNESS: I don't know.
11:00:41 20	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. Well, what happens to
11:00:47 21	underperforming employees at Adobe in terms of their
11:00:50 22	compensation?
11:00:51 23	A. I don't know.
11:00:58 24	Q. Are underperforming employees paid below the
11:01:02 25	minimum of their salary range?

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- A. I don't know.
- Q. Generally speaking, would an underperforming employee at Adobe still be paid within the salary range associated with his or her job code?
  - A. I don't know. Have to look.
- Q. Are you aware of any policy at Adobe with regard to paying underperforming employees within the salary range associated with their job code?
  - A. A policy? No.
- Q. Are you aware of a general practice at Adobe with regard to paying underperforming employees within the salary range associated with their job code?
  - A. I'm not aware of a practice.
- Q. Is underperformance one reason why an employee might be paid less than the minimum salary associated with their job code?
- A. I don't know. So as part of the annual review process, if somebody is underperforming, we typically encourage managers to have a conversation around the performance. And ultimately it's their discretion, but it doesn't send an aligned message if you are giving somebody a merit increase when they're not performing.
- So, you know, from that perspective -- but that really doesn't dictate whether a person is going to end up being below the minimum or not, because they may

11:02:53 1	already be above the minimum of the range when you have
11:02:56 2	that conversation, but we just may not opt to give them
11:02:59 3	an annual increase.
11:03:00 4	Q. Does Adobe have a policy against awarding merit
11:03:03 5	salary increases to employees who are underperforming?
11:03:06 6	A. It's not a policy. As it relates to a lot of
11:03:11 7	this, most of this stuff is not policy, it's framework
11:03:14 8	and guidelines. So I would say that, you know, we give
11:03:16 9	them the framework and guidelines. Ultimately they have
11:03:19 10	to own the decision.
11:03:21 11	Q. Does Adobe maintain a guideline against
11:03:28 12	awarding merit salary increases to employees who are
11:03:28 12 11:03:31 13	awarding merit salary increases to employees who are underperformers?
11:03:31 13	underperformers?
11:03:31 13 11:03:32 14	underperformers?  A. So yes. You know, as we provide a framework
11:03:31 13 11:03:32 14 11:03:36 15	underperformers?  A. So yes. You know, as we provide a framework and guidelines, what we will what we will typically
11:03:31 13 11:03:32 14 11:03:36 15 11:03:40 16	underperformers?  A. So yes. You know, as we provide a framework and guidelines, what we will what we will typically encourage is that if you've got somebody that's
11:03:31 13 11:03:32 14 11:03:36 15 11:03:40 16 11:03:42 17	underperformers?  A. So yes. You know, as we provide a framework and guidelines, what we will what we will typically encourage is that if you've got somebody that's underperforming, you might want to think about not

- increasing an underperforming employee's salary at focal review?
  - They have discretion to do that. Α.
  - And you just testified, correct me if I'm Q. wrong, that managers have discretion to give merit increases to underperforming employees?

KRAMM COURT REPORTING

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11:04:16 1	A. They do.
11:04:16 2	Q. Do the managers' managers have discretion to
11:04:21 3	undo salary increases to underperforming employees in
11:04:25 4	their review of a managers' salary allocation decisions?
11:04:30 5	A. Yes. They have the discretion to say I
11:04:32 6	disagree with what you are doing. Hopefully they have a
11:04:37 7	conversation about why.
11:04:48 8	Q. When well, if and when there arises a
11:04:51 9	disagreement between a direct manager and that managers'
11:04:58 10	manager over salary increases, who wins?
11:05:03 11	A. I don't know the answer to that.
11:05:14 12	Q. So your manager right now is Debbie Streeter?
11:05:17 13	A. Correct.
11:05:18 14	Q. And you have how many reports right now?
11:05:22 15	A. Five.
11:05:24 16	Q. What are their names?
11:05:28 17	A. Richard Hawksworthe, Mandy Lau.
11:05:31 18	Q. Could you spell Hawksworthe.
11:05:32 19	A. H-A-W-K-S-W-O-R-T-H-E.
11:05:41 20	Mandy Lau, L-A-U, and then Swati Rashrinhan.
11:05:51 21	Q. We'll need you to spell that.
11:05:53 22	A. I'll need my spell check. I think it's
11:05:55 23	R-A-S-H-R-I-N-H-A-N I'd have to confirm that,
11:06:05 24	though Luz Garcia, and Karen Doris-Hampton. Those

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are my direct reports.

11:19:24	1	A. God, getting into a level of granularity I
11:19:34	2	don't remember. Well, I probably shouldn't because I
11:19:36	3	don't remember.
11:19:37	4	Q. If you don't remember, that's fair.
11:19:40	5	A. Okay.
11:19:41	6	Q. I guess what I'm trying to understand is, if I
11:19:43	7	was either a lazy or completely mathematically
11:19:48	8	challenged manager who couldn't deal with percentages
11:19:50	9	and numbers
11:19:51	10	A. Yeah.
11:19:51	11	Q is there a way that I could use that salary
11:19:54	12	tool to tell the software how I ranked my employees and
11:19:59	13	have the salary tool tell me by how much I should
11:20:03	14	increase each of their salaries and stay within my
11:20:06	15	budget?
11:20:06	16	A. Yeah. And I don't remember. I'm inclined to
11:20:10	17	say no. And the reason I say that, and I'm just you
11:20:13	18	know, I don't remember this, but we typically had a
11:20:16	19	range, right? And so unless you kind of defaulted, you
11:20:23	20	wouldn't know where to pick within the range
11:20:25	21	automatically.
11:20:26	22	Q. So what do you mean, unless I unless the
11:20:28	23	manager defaulted?
11:20:31	24	A. Unless we program the tool to default. Not the
11:20:34	25	manager.

11:20:39 1	Q. Do you mean if Adobe programmed the tool to
11:20:42 2	default as a matter of Adobe policy?
11:20:44 3	MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.
11:20:45 4	THE WITNESS: No. Your question to me was, you
11:20:47 5	know, does the software, you know, provide a mechanism
11:20:49 6	for the lazy manager to go ahead and input a ranking and
11:20:53 7	then automatically recommend an increase? And I'm
11:20:55 8	saying unless I don't think that would have been the
11:20:58 9	case, I can't remember, because we had a range typically
11:21:03 10	for any performance level. It wasn't like a flat
11:21:05 11	amount.
11:21:06 12	And so unless we programmed to some sort of
11:21:10 13	default within that range, it wouldn't have known what
11:21:13 14	to pick, right? So I guess I'm telling you I don't know
11:21:17 15	because I don't remember what was programmed.
11:21:19 16	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. Okay then, I'll stick
11:21:21 17	with the "I don't know."
11:21:29 18	So I'm turning to paragraph 7, back to
11:21:33 19	paragraph 7 of Donna Morris' declaration. And the first
11:21:38 20	sentence states, "Adobe did not determine compensation
11:21:41 21	for individual employees on a company-wide basis."
11:21:44 22	Did I read that right?
11:21:45 23	A. Yeah.
11:21:46 24	Q. And is that your understanding do you
11:21:48 25	believe that to be true?

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11:	22	:	5	1	2	1	
11:	22	:	5	6	2	2	
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A. I do.

Q. And Ms. Morris continues, "Instead, managers determine the compensation for individual employees within a business unit, and were required to differentiate compensation among employees based on performance levels, performance reviews, and the manager's assessment of the employee's expected future contribution to the company."

Did I get that right?

- A. Correct.
- Q. Do you agree with that as well?
- A. I do.
- Q. How did Adobe require managers to differentiate compensation among employees?
- A. So we, again, provided a guideline and framework. We have a pay for performance philosophy, so our ask of managers was that, you know, they factor in contributions of the employee in their performance when making their decisions. We would provide a guideline that would say, you know, based on this ranking, you might want to think about a increase within this range.

And so the guidelines were structured in such a way that they helped encourage differentiation. But ultimately the manager kind of is responsible for making that decision.

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- Q. So would the sentence that we just read of Ms. Morris' declaration where she states that managers were required to differentiate compensation among employees, would it be more accurate to say that managers were encouraged to differentiate compensation among employees?
  - A. Yeah. That would probably be better.
- Q. Was there an enforcement mechanism for requiring managers to differentiate compensation?
  - A. No.
- Q. How does Adobe go about differentiating compensation based on performance?

MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.

THE WITNESS: Again, we put the onus on the manager, you know, through our trainings. And we're pretty transparent with this with our employees too. We constantly talk about the fact that we are a pay for performance company that, you know, we expect that employees that are contributing at a higher level are going to realize higher compensation in general.

But it's also very individual, right? And managers kind of make those assessments and judgments on an individualized basis. It can be very different, but from a framework and a guidelines perspective, a lot of the education and the discussions and the information

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11:24:29 1	that we share, we kind of keep hounding that notion in,
11:24:32 2	right? Pay for performance, make sure we're
11:24:35 3	differentiating. This is not a "everybody gets paid the
11:24:40 4	same" environment.
11:24:46 5	Q. Do you know when Adobe started using the term
11:24:49 6	"pay for performance" to describe its compensation
11:24:52 7	philosophy?
11:24:53 8	A. Yeah. I'd have I don't know exactly when.
11:24:55 9	I'd have to go look at our documents, you know. It's
11:25:00 10	very prevalent in the world of compensation. So I feel
11:25:03 11	like it's been around forever, but I'd have to go back
11:25:10 12	and look at Adobe's documentation to see when we started
11:25:14 13	marketing it that way.
11:25:16 14	Q. Do you know when Adobe started using the term
11:25:18 15	"differentiating" to describe its or differentiating
11:25:20 16	based on performance?
11:25:21 17	A. No. I don't remember exactly when.
11:25:33 18	Q. Is it fair to say that Adobe has aspired to pay
11:25:35 19	for performance and differentiate salaries based on
11:25:38 20	performance throughout the class period?
11:25:40 21	A. Yes.
11:25:51 22	MR. KIERNAN: Can we take a short break if you
11:25:52 23	are going into another paragraph?
11:25:54 24	MS. LEEBOVE: Uh-huh.

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Just five minutes.

MR. KIERNAN:

11:25:56 1	MS. LEEBOVE: Yes.
11:25:58 2	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This is end of video No. 2.
11:25:59 3	The time is 11:26. We're going off the record.
11:26:07 4	(Recess taken.)
11:39:22 5	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This is the beginning of
11:39:23 6	video No. 3 in the deposition of Rosemary
11:39:29 7	Arriada-Keiper.
11:39:30 8	The time is 11:39 a.m. We're back on the
11:39:33 9	record.
11:39:37 10	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. So Ms. Arriada-Keiper,
11:39:38 11	I'm going to hand you a document that's already been
11:39:41 12	marked as Exhibit 300 to the deposition of Jeff
11:39:45 13	Vijungco.
11:39:53 14	MR. KIERNAN: Let me just so this doesn't
11:39:55 15	get
11:39:58 16	MS. LEEBOVE: Do you need an extra clip?
11:40:00 17	MR. KIERNAN: No. Thanks, Lisa.
11:40:03 18	The court reporter will take this at the end,
11:40:05 19	so I want to make sure.
11:40:12 20	Okay.
11:40:24 21	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. So Ms. Arriada-Keiper, I
11:40:25 22	can tell you my questions are not about the email
11:40:29 23	messages so much as about the attachment
11:40:31 24	A. Okay.
11:40:31 25	Q which is the U.S. Frequently Asked Questions

12:01:03 1	(Whereupon, Exhibit 2488 was marked for
12:01:03 2	identification.)
12:01:04 3	MS. LEEBOVE: And, Counsel, I've been writing
12:01:05 4	the exhibit number on the documents I've been handing
12:01:08 5	you. I'm not sure if that's something you want me to
12:01:11 6	stop doing.
12:01:12 7	MR. KIERNAN: No, that's great. I usually do
12:01:13 8	it. If you are going to do it, that's wonderful.
12:01:17 9	MS. LEEBOVE: That way I know at least if at
12:01:20 10	least we'll be on the wrong page together.
12:01:23 11	MR. KIERNAN: That's right.
12:01:28 12	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. So Ms. Arriada-Keiper,
12:01:29 13	you've been handed a document that's been marked
12:01:32 14	Exhibit 2488. It bears the first page bears a
12:01:35 15	Bates stamp ADOBE_100344 and it runs through 100367.
12:01:42 16	And please take the time that you need to review it.
12:03:48 17	A. Wow.
12:03:50 18	Q. Do you recognize Exhibit 2488?
12:03:55 19	A. I do not.
12:03:55 20	Q. Have you ever seen Exhibit 2488 before?
12:03:57 21	A. No.
12:04:02 22	Q. If you turn to page 100347, it's page 4 of the
12:04:07 23	document.
12:04:11 24	A. Yeah.
12:04:16 25	Q. In the sort of second arrow it says,

12:04:19 1	"Inconsistent application of performance criteria," and
12:04:23 2	then there is an arrow pointing toward "Consistent
12:04:27 3	application."
12:04:30 4	Have you ever are you aware that managers
12:04:38 5	within Adobe were inconsistently applying performance
12:04:42 6	criteria in reviewing their employees for salary
12:04:47 7	increases?
12:04:48 8	MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.
12:04:53 9	THE WITNESS: I was not.
12:04:57 10	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. Do you know whether Adobe
12:04:58 11	has monitored whether managers are consistently
12:05:01 12	applying performance criteria over the class period?
12:05:04 13	A. I don't know. You know, like I mentioned
12:05:08 14	before, we do look at distributions and differentiation,
12:05:12 15	but I don't know about monitor, per se. It's more
12:05:17 16	reporting back out.
12:05:19 17	Q. Do you know well, does this appear to you to
12:05:28 18	be a presentation prepared by Debbie Streeter?
12:05:33 19	A. Has her name on it.
12:05:38 20	Q. Have you ever discussed with Debbie Streeter
12:05:40 21	whether managers have been inconsistently applying
12:05:43 22	performance criteria?
12:05:44 23	A. No.
12:05:48 24	Q. Is there something about well, are you aware

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whether there has been a shift at some point, or whether

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12:06:02	1	there was a shift during the class period from
12:06:07	2	inconsistent application of performance criteria to
12:06:10	3	consistent application of performance criteria?
12:06:13	4	A. I don't know if there was a shift, you know.
12:06:16	5	What I would say is during the class period, we did a

Ο. What was the purpose of that strong messaging?

lot of strong messaging around the importance of pay for

performance models and the importance of differentiating

and assessing people based on their contributions.

- I think to emphasize, you know, to the organization that we are a pay for performance culture. Really wanting to educate employees and managers around that.
- Q. During the class period, was there already a strong pay for performance culture or was Adobe trying to create a strong pay for performance culture during the class period?
- I don't know the answer to that. When I joined Α. the company as an employee, it was very evident to me that it was a pay for performance model.
  - That was back in --Q.
  - 198. Α.
  - Q. -- '98?
- Were you aware of any discussion within Adobe during the class period about inconsistent application

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12:07:50	1	of performance criteria?
12:07:51	2	A. No.
12:08:01	3	Q. Have you ever believed that managers were
12:08:03	4	inconsistently applying performance criteria?
12:08:09	5	A. I believe some managers are better at applying
12:08:13	6	differentiating than others.
12:08:22	7	Q. Does Adobe reward managers that are better than
12:08:26	8	others at applying performance criteria?
12:08:31	9	A. No.
12:08:36	10	Q. What, if anything, does Adobe do to make sure
12:08:39	11	that managers consistently apply performance criteria to
12:08:42	12	employees in making salary decisions?
12:08:46	13	A. We continue to educate and educate and educate.
12:08:48	14	Q. Is there an enforcement mechanism to accompany
12:08:50	15	that education?
12:08:51	16	A. Not really. Because at the end of the day, you
12:08:53	17	know, they have the discretion.
12:09:06	18	Q. Okay. We may come back to this.
12:09:11	19	A. All right.
12:09:12	20	Q. Set it aside, but don't throw it away.
12:09:14	21	A. Okay.
12:09:22	22	MS. LEEBOVE: I'll have this marked next in
12:09:24	23	order, please.
12:09:39	24	(Whereupon, Exhibit 2489 was marked for
12:09:39	25	identification.)

12:15:40 1	constitutes an adequate differentiation based on
12:15:44 2	performance?
12:15:44 3	I know your attorney is going to object to this
12:15:47 4	question.
12:15:50 5	MR. KIERNAN: As soon as I start looking out
12:15:51 6	and gazing out the window.
12:15:56 7	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. But I think your earlier
12:15:59 8	testimony has been that Adobe makes no effort to
12:16:02 9	equalize pay.
12:16:03 10	A. Correct.
12:16:04 11	Q. And so just assuming that every employee is
12:16:14 12	already paid differently, how does what does a
12:16:23 13	successful what is successful pay differentiation
12:16:27 14	based on performance?
12:16:31 15	MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.
12:16:33 16	THE WITNESS: Yeah. So it's hard to answer
12:16:34 17	that question, right? Because it's so unique and
12:16:38 18	individualized. But, you know, from a compensation
12:16:41 19	practice perspective, you are taking a snapshot in time.
12:16:44 20	And our snapshot generally tends to be the annual focal
12:16:48 21	review, right?
12:16:48 22	So the correlation there is as you start to
12:16:51 23	kind of roll up all this information, what you want to
12:16:54 24	see is that generally an HI is getting, on average, a

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greater increase than somebody who is a strong, than

12:17:00 1 somebody who is an SC, right? (Reporter clarification.) 12:17:08 2 12:17:08 3 THE WITNESS: Than somebody who is a solid contributor. An SC. Sorry. We have all of these 12:17:10 4 12:17:11 5 acronyms. 12:17:13 6 So high impact, strong contributor, solid 12:17:16 7 contributor and a low performer. So on an individualized basis, you may or may not find that 12:17:22 8 12:17:25 9 people fall into that constraint. But on an aggregate 12:17:28 10 level is what we're really striving for, you want to see 12:17:31 11 that, right? And if you go back and you look at the 12:17:33 12 data, you'll see examples of that. 12:17:37 13 Q. Did Adobe ever target a particular percentage 12:17:40 14 difference in compensation between high performers and 12:17:47 15 strong performers? 12:17:49 16 Α.

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Again, managers ultimately have the discretion, but the way we set up the guidelines, they're structured in such a way that the guidelines actually encourage that differentiation.

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Q. And are there guidelines that recommend, by percentage, particular -- are there guidelines that recommend to managers a particular percentage salary increase based on an employee's performance ranking?

A.

- Q. Have there been percentage range guidelines for salary increases according to performance rating throughout the class period?
  - A. Say that again. Sorry.
  - Q. I don't know if I can.

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12:20:16 1 Let me back up. 12:20:28 4 12:21:09 13 Are you familiar with the term "midpoint 12:21:12 14 compression"? 12:21:13 15 I am not familiar with midpoint compression. 12:21:16 16 I'm familiar with midpoint and compression. 12:21:21 17 Well, what is -- are you familiar with use of 12:21:26 18 the term "compression" in compensation speak? 12:21:29 19 Α. Yes. 12:21:30 20 And what does the term "compression" mean in 12:21:32 21 compensation language? 12:21:33 22 So compression essentially means, are you creating kind of an issue -- we typically use it in 12:21:37 23 the context of new hires. So what happens is the 12:21:40 24 external market is moving at a pace that's more 12:21:45 25

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- A. Not really, because I can't read it very well. Yeah, no.
- Q. What, if anything, do you understand Delia was referring to when she says that the midpoint compression can -- well, she says, "The midpoint compression is a reality."

And then skipping down, "It is not necessarily a bad thing (in the future a role like this can bring more stability to our internal equity), but the implementation now is completely affecting our internal equity."

Do you understand what she means by that?

- A. I don't know exactly what she means by that.
- Q. What do you understand this to mean?
- A. So what -- I understand compression, and I know Romania is a market where volatility with the labor market is really high, and the rates move quite a bit. So they are challenged, oftentimes with compression issues as an organization, because there is such a high demand in the market, and the internal pay rates aren't aligning to the market.

So I'm guessing it has something to do with that. But I don't really know what she means by simulation of the -- I don't know what she's doing here.

Q. Okay. And so what is it -- is it fair to say

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01:33:04 that Delia, based on her Friday, January 8th message at 1 01:33:10 8:26 p.m., and her earlier message at 12:40 p.m. on that 2 01:33:17 3 same date, it's -- does it seem fair to say that she believes that the compression issue is -- what -- well, 01:33:26 4 what do you understand her to mean by internal equity? 01:33:32 5 01:33:34 6 That it's affecting -- compression is affecting Adobe's 01:33:39 7 internal equity or badly affecting internal equity? I don't -- I'm not sure what she's referencing 01:33:45 8 Α. 01:33:47 9

- here.
- Have you used the term "internal equity" in Q. your work in compensation?
  - A. Yep.
  - What does internal equity mean? Q.
- So we use internal equity primarily in the Α. capacity of looking at, again, typically new hires. So what we try to do is similar to when I talked about this notion around compression, it's kind of the same concept. When you are bringing somebody in at a higher rate than everybody else in your organization, you want to be cognizant of why you are doing that.

There is a number of reasons. Sometimes it's compression, sometimes it's because you've got a star player, you may have a team of individuals that aren't high impact employees. There is a variety of reasons. But as managers kind of consider their decisions, we do

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ask them to kind of think about the pay of their team members, right?

- Q. And why, though?
- A. Because it can, again, from a management perspective, just create some opportunities for discussions with managers because employees talk about their compensation. So if a manager can clearly articulate it, then great, right?

But we just want them to be aware that if you've got a high impact employee in your organization, and you are now bringing somebody in from the outside that's not proven themselves, you might have to explain why. And so, you know, you have the right to do that, just make sure that you understand why you are making the decisions that you are making.

Q. Does -- is there a fear within Adobe that internal inequity would affect employee morale?

MR. KIERNAN: Objection to form.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. No. How can I explain internal equity? Internal equity is, again, just another factor that we ask kind of managers to think about as they're making decisions relative to people's salaries. It's, you know, often looked at as kind of a factor that you think about, but it doesn't really dictate anything, it just kind of informs, right?

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01:36:01 So myself, as an example, if I'm bringing in 1 somebody from the outside and I'm thinking about what's 2 this offer that I want to make to this individual, I 3 will generally look at my team and see where they're 4 positioned, you know, and kind of make a judgment call there. Because I do know that these individuals are 7 going to be working side by side, and, you know, it can potentially have implications for me as a manager if they're performing exactly the same way and they feel like there is not a perceived fairness in terms of their pay, right?

MS. LEEBOVE: Q. I'm sorry, did I interrupt you?

A. No.

- Q. So what would the implications be for you as a manager?
- A. A conversation to have to explain to the individual why I made the decision that I did, right?

  And there may be reasons for why I do that, and I'm perfectly comfortable with it.

And in other instances, I may say you know what? It's not worth it to me. I don't want to create an issue where five people are going to be pissed off because this person, you know, makes more than them and haven't been here to prove themselves. So I have to

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01:37:05 1 rationalize that as a manager.

- Q. So why would you not want to have your employees pissed off?
- A. Why would I not want to have them pissed off?

  You know, I generally like a happy environment. People are more productive when they're not angry.
- Q. And then is there -- could it -- is there a concern that the lack of internal equity might affect employee attrition?
  - A. No.
- Q. Have you ever had an experience as a manager where you did pay a team member disproportionately compared to other team members and those who were not paid highly complained to you?
  - A. Yeah.
  - Q. And what was the -- what happened?
- A. So in that particular case, the individual that we were bringing externally had a skill set that the team didn't have. So my conversation with them was an easy one for me as a manager to say, you know what?

  This has to do with the capabilities of this individual. If you want to be compensated at the same level, you are going to need to go build this capability. You don't have it today. So those are easy.
  - Q. And then is there a way for employees who are

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03:14:39 1	So you can potentially have people who have
03:14:45 2	different types of job responsibilities benchmarked into
03:14:48 3	the same job. Does that help? And that oftentimes
03:14:51 4	translates into titles as well, but it's not the title
03:14:53 5	that drives that. It's what is this person doing.
03:15:08 6	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. If we can move on to
03:15:11 7	paragraph 8
03:15:12 8	A. Okay.
03:15:12 9	Q of Donna Morris' declaration.
03:15:15 10	A. All right. Eight. All right.
03:15:19 11	Q. If you could just have a look at paragraph 8.
03:15:25 12	And I think you have mentioned you haven't seen the
03:15:29 13	exhibits to the Morris declaration before today?
03:15:31 14	A. I'm glad you brought that up. Because as I was
03:15:33 15	thinking about that so I have seen the exhibits. I
03:15:35 16	didn't see it in conjunction at the same time it
03:15:39 17	wasn't presented to me in one packet. So I had seen
03:15:44 18	them prior to signing the declaration.
03:15:45 19	Q. Okay.
03:15:49 20	MR. KIERNAN: Does that make sense, Lisa? What
03:15:51 21	she's saying is she didn't see it
03:15:53 22	THE WITNESS: Like this.
03:15:55 23	MR. KIERNAN: like
03:15:56 24	THE WITNESS: That's what I thought you were
03:15:57 25	meaning. But I had reviewed it in different forms prior

03:15:59 1	to signing the declaration.
03:16:24 2	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. So let me ask you a
03:16:25 3	question. You hadn't seen the whole declaration
03:16:28 4	assembled with the exhibits attached, but you had
03:16:30 5	seen the exhibits before?
03:16:31 6	A. Yes.
03:16:32 7	Q. Had you seen the exhibits knowing that they
03:16:36 8	were the document had you seen exhibits knowing
03:16:40 9	that they were the documents referred to in the
03:16:42 10	declaration?
03:16:42 11	A. Yes.
03:16:43 12	Q. Okay.
03:16:44 13	A. Yes.
03:16:48 14	Q. Is it your experience at Adobe that Adobe has
03:16:51 15	reinforced its policy of differentiating compensation
03:16:54 16	through training and other practices?
03:16:56 17	A. It is.
03:16:58 18	Q. Has Adobe reinforced its policy of
03:17:02 19	differentiating compensation through training and other
03:17:05 20	practices throughout the class period?
03:17:06 21	A. Yes.
03:17:07 22	Q. How has Adobe reinforced its policy of
03:17:14 23	differentiating compensation?
03:17:18 24	A. I think it's done through a number of vehicles
03:17:20 25	that we've kind of talked about. So if you think about

the salary matrices as an example, right? You can see
kind of there is an embedded differentiation that
happens, they're in the creation of the guidelines,
right? We're encouraging people to assess, kind of, and
label your folks in terms of performance level. And
then we give guidelines that help to guide them in terms
of differentiating.

I think in all of the communications we do -and that's something that's pretty unique. You know,
having worked at Oracle where they never shared anything
with the employee population, coming over to Adobe, it's
a very transparent environment. We're pretty good
about, you know, talking to them about the fact that we
do pay for performance. The training materials talk
about it.

So I think it's just more of a -- we kind of foster an environment that's very candid and open about talking about these things and articulating how we try to do these things. You know, at the end of the day, you know, everything is mitigated by budget and kind of my manager's discretion.

But I would be surprised, you know, if you randomly went in and talked to any employee and asked them do you think Adobe is a pay for performance environment. Most people would probably say yeah,

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applied?

03:18:28 1 because we ingrain it in their head so much through the
03:18:35 2 different communication vehicles.
03:18:38 3 Q. Has the communication of Adobe's policy
03:18:42 4 resulted in the application of the policy to the facts
03:18:47 5 of -- well, is the policy something that's discussed
03:18:53 6 or -- and/or is the policy something that's actually

A. So, again, it's less of a policy and more of, you know, guidelines and information that we provide for people to kind of make decisions on. And, you know, through the reporting that we provide back out, when you look at this information on an aggregated level, I think you will find that the data is going to show you, yeah, we do a pretty good differentiating job.

Again, on an individual basis, you might see some anomalies, but from a high level perspective, we feel we do a good job of differentiating.

- Q. If you turn within the exhibits here, I believe it's the last exhibit, if you turn to ADOBE\_009303. Probably best find it by flipping from the back.
  - A. Okay. 9303.
- Q. 009303. Yes. And it has in the very bottom right corner 009303-9.
  - A. Yeah.
  - Q. Okay.

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- 03:19:59 21
- 03:20:01 22
- 03:20:06 23
- 03:20:09 24
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03:20:13 1	A. All right.
03:20:14 2	MR. KIERNAN: Maybe start with the first page.
03:20:18 3	My isn't that the first page of this? 009295.
03:20:25 4	MS. LEEBOVE: I'm looking at 009303-9.
03:20:30 5	MR. KIERNAN: Sorry, Lisa, what I meant is
03:20:31 6	maybe show her the first page of that exhibit.
03:20:36 7	MS. LEEBOVE: The truth is, I don't know where
03:20:37 8	the first page of that exhibit is.
03:20:40 9	MR. KIERNAN: If you go back, it will have
03:20:42 10	Exhibit 5. If you just count back to has 301, 302,
03:20:50 11	then it goes 301, 300, 299, 298, 297.
03:20:58 12	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. 295. 009295 appears to
03:21:02 13	be the first page of Exhibit 5.
03:21:04 14	A. Yes.
03:21:08 15	Q. Have you seen the HR strategic plan for 2010
03:21:11 16	through 2013 before?
03:21:12 17	A. Yeah.
03:21:13 18	Q. Okay. Was it created by Donna Morris?
03:21:18 19	A. I don't know.
03:21:21 20	Q. Do you know where the strategic plan was
03:21:23 21	presented?
03:21:25 22	A. I've seen it at an all-hands meeting hosted by
03:21:28 23	Donna Morris.
03:21:30 24	Q. And who is the audience for
03:21:34 25	A. HR.

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03:26:44	1	hand you want managers to make the decisions that
03:26:47	2	they're going to make, but on the other hand you
03:26:48	3	want managers to make the decisions that you want
03:26:51	4	them to make? How do you reconcile those two
03:26:54	5	things?
03:26:54	6	A. I think we want them to make informed

A. I think we want them to make informed decisions. We want them to kind of understand, you know, what it is that we're trying to drive. And as long as they have the information, and they're making an informed decision and feel like, you know, they can justify it, then it's okay.

And there is many a times you are going to see where managers don't follow our guidelines and don't do what we do. And that's okay, right? We just want them to kind of make the best decision that they can given the information that they have.

- Q. If you turn to the next page, 009304-10.
- A. Okay.
- Q. The header on the page says, "Future State Overview Managing Performance."
  - A. Yeah.
- Q. And the second bullet down reads, "Shift from loose guidelines to firm standards based on performance, measurement for pay, and equity programs."

Did I read that right?

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03:28:00 1	A. Uh-huh.
03:28:01 2	Q. What does that mean?
03:28:02 3	A. I don't know.
03:28:06 4	Q. Have you been privy to any discussions within
03:28:10 5	Adobe about shifting from loose guidelines to firm
03:28:13 6	standards based on performance measurement for pay and
03:28:16 7	equity programs?
03:28:17 8	A. No. I mean, you can see that all along we've
03:28:19 9	kind of provided the guidelines. The guidelines haven't
03:28:21 10	really changed. So I'm not sure kind of what the
03:28:25 11	statement there is implying.
03:28:42 12	Q. If you turn to page dash 12.
03:28:48 13	A. Okay.
03:28:55 14	Q. The header is "Total Rewards Strategic
03:28:58 15	Success," and the second bullet reads, "We are shifting
03:29:01 16	our strategy to align to a pay for performance culture."
03:29:07 17	What does that mean to you?
03:29:10 18	A. I don't know. As far as I know, we've been a
03:29:16 19	pay for performance culture since I joined the company,
03:29:18 20	so
03:29:26 21	Stronger messaging, potentially.
03:29:31 22	Q. So is it your so it's your understanding
03:29:33 23	that there always has been a pay for performance
03:29:35 24	culture?
02 20 26 25	7 ITI had

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Uh-huh.

A.

03:29:37 1	Q. And there would be no need to shift the
03:29:40 2	strategy to align to that?
03:29:42 3	A. No. I don't know that our strategy has ever
03:29:46 4	been different. As it relates to pay for performance.
03:29:52 5	The processes and stuff you can always kind of enhance
03:29:55 6	and improve, but, you know.
03:29:59 7	Q. And then the next page, page 13, it says,
03:30:05 8	"Future State Overview Total Rewards Priorities."
03:30:09 9	A. Yeah.
03:30:11 10	Q. And the third one says, "Ensure rewards are
03:30:14 11	differentiated based on exceptional company and
03:30:17 12	individual performance for merit equity and variable
03:30:19 13	compensation."
03:30:21 14	A. Uh-huh.
03:30:22 15	Q. Did I read that right?
03:30:23 16	A. You did.
03:30:24 17	Q. And are you aware of any steps that have been
03:30:26 18	taken to ensure rewards are differentiated based on
03:30:31 19	exceptional company and individual performance?
03:30:33 20	A. So I think we've done all of these things. One
03:30:35 21	thing that you just triggered when you said that, and
03:30:37 22	maybe that's kind of the bullet point here. But let me
03:30:41 23	give you an example; profit sharing. It was a program

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contribution as a company. If the company was

that we had in place, regardless of your individual

successful, everybody got paid same amount of money, right?

So part of our reasoning and our strategy to get away from that was we wanted to not just have this plan that gave everybody a reward regardless of their individual -- regardless of their individual contribution. Something in -- that's probably what this might be referencing. Just really looking at our programs and ensuring that they kind of support an environment that, you know, pays for performance.

- Q. Well, what was the reason why Adobe eliminated profit sharing?
- A. So there was a couple reasons. I think one was we wanted to move in the direction of aligning any programs that we had for our employees so that they were based on performance.

There was also, with the profit sharing plan, it was a lot of money that the company had no discretion to be able to determine whether they wanted to pay out. So if there was a particular condition in the market or what have you, you know, we had to pay out. They had no discretion there. And so I believe that that was part of the discussion that went into why we wanted some more flexibility in terms of those funds and how you allocated them.

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04:01:45 1	too. They hear the same messaging, right? I think, you
04:01:48 2	know, how we kind of bring that level of visibility to
04:01:52 3	them is just through the tool, they can kind of see it.
04:01:54 4	Through reporting they can kind of see that information.
04:01:58 5	So it's highlighted to them, right?
04:02:01 6	You know, in the tool, as an example, if you
04:02:03 7	are a manager and you go to give an increase to someone
04:02:06 8	that's above the maximum of the range, it will tell you,
04:02:09 9	hey, do you know the person is above the maximum in the
04:02:12 10	range. Still move forward, but it kind of you know.
04:02:15 11	Q. It will accept the change but with a warning?
04:02:20 12	A. Yeah.
04:02:26 13	Q. How many times can an employee can an
04:02:29 14	employee be a low performer before they're asked to
04:02:32 15	leave the company?
04:02:33 16	MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.
04:02:34 17	THE WITNESS: That, I don't know. I don't know
04:02:36 18	about that.
04:02:39 19	MS. LEEBOVE: Q. Is there a point at which
04:02:41 20	a person who is a an employee who is a low
04:02:43 21	performer year after year is asked to leave?
04:02:48 22	A. That's kind of case by case, I'm sure. Our
04:02:51 23	lawyers get involved. I would tell you that me as a
04:02:55 24	manager, it wouldn't take I wouldn't want year after

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year of low performance before I dealt with that issue.

04:02:59 1 But it's going to be situational, right?

Q. Do top level executive leadership and senior vice presidents ultimately approve managers' salary decisions with respect to their reports?

A. So it's interesting, because I keep seeing the terminology "approval" come up. And what ends up happening is there is not a snap of a button where they have to say, "I approve this change." What in effect happens is my kind of chain of command has visibility into any of the recommendations that I make, right?

So as my boss, who is very hands on, she's actively looking at the recommendations that we're making. And if she feels like, hey, Rose, there is one on here that, "Why are you doing that," we'll have a conversation around that, right? And most of the time she'll empower me to kind of move forward and I can kind of make the business case.

But some leaders are really good about actively kind of engaging in that process, and others just say you know what? I'm going to trust my managers to do that. So I think it just depends from manager to manager what the level. But it's not like the tool says, okay, Rose, when you make a recommendation, it now gets submitted to your manager who then has to press an approval key so that keeps rolling. It just doesn't

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04:04:33 1	work that way, right?
04:04:35 2	So I think, you know, when we talk about
04:04:37 3	approval, I don't know how many are actively engaging to
04:04:41 4	say, "I approve of these recommendations," right? Some
04:04:43 5	probably are, others probably don't ever look.
04:04:48 6	Q. Does this roll-up process actually roll up to
04:04:50 7	this CEO of the company?
04:04:52 8	A. It does. Ultimately the CEO is kind of
04:04:58 9	responsible for, you know, at a company level what
04:05:03 10	budget do we come in, what does the distribution look
04:05:05 11	like. So at any point in time, Shantanu could go look
04:05:10 12	at anybody's record.
04:05:12 13	Q. Has Mr. Narayen ever blocked a salary increase
04:05:16 14	for an individual employee?
04:05:22 15	A. Not that I'm aware of.
04:05:23 16	Q. Or required a salary increase for an employee
04:05:25 17	who wasn't going to receive one?
04:05:27 18	A. Not that I know of. I think Shantanu is
04:05:28 19	probably more focused on his directs more than anybody
04:05:31 20	else.
04:05:44 21	Q. How does Adobe determine bonus and equity
04:05:46 22	grants?
04:05:50 23	A. So Adobe doesn't determine the grants. We
04:05:56 24	for bonuses or equity, we provide the guidelines. From
04:06:02 25	a bonus perspective, the company's performance dictates

04:06:07 1 whether there is going to be any funding, right? So
04:06:09 2 depending on the company's performance, that will
04:06:12 3 determine how much funding is available, and then
04:06:14 4 managers have to go in and assess the contributions of
04:06:17 5 their employees, similar to a salary process, and
04:06:19 6 determine, you know, how much they want to allocate in
04:06:21 7 terms of the bonus amount.

From an equity perspective, it's the same idea. We also give a pool of shares for managers to allocate based on performance. But with equity it's a little bit unique in that we have a pool of shares and those shares have to be approved by our shareholders. And so we have to be very conscientious in terms of the dilution impact to those pool of shares. So I guess that mitigates or determines ultimately how much we're going to have available to give to employees.

Q. How is there -- well, how substantial can an employee's equity share -- or how substantial an equity share award can an employee receive -- or what's the maximum equity share award an employee can receive for a given year?

MR. KIERNAN: Object to form.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. So, there is a difference between shares and value. So we create a pool of shares based on kind of the budget availability, market

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04:07:39 1 practice, et cetera, and managers have the discretion to 04:07:44 apply those shares. The value can fluctuate, right? 2 04:07:48 Depending on the market price. 3 04:07:51 So I could have given you a hundred shares as 4 04:07:55 part of the annual review, and on the day that I granted 5 04:07:58 them to you, they were valued at \$30, and a year from 6 today they may be valued at \$40. The value has gone up 04:08:04 7 04:08:08 significantly, so.... 8 MS. LEEBOVE: Q. Do those shares generally 04:08:11 9 04:08:13 10 vest immediately or is there a vesting? 04:08:15 11 04:08:44 21 (Reporter interruption.) 04:08:45 22 MS. LEEBOVE: Let's try that again. 04:08:46 23

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- A. That's correct.
- Q. -- they received?
- A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. Would you please take a look at paragraphs 22 through 26?
  - A. Yeah.
- Q. And let me know whether there is anything in those that you disagree with or would change to make them more accurate or truthful from your perspective.
  - A. Okay.
- Q. Is there anything about paragraphs 22 through 26 you would change to make them more accurate?
- A. Not more accurate. In paragraph 22, the last statement there, just a little confusing, right? It says, "Because managers were required to allocate the salary budget among employees within their own group, increasing one employee's compensation effectively meant paying less to another employee within the group."

I'm not quite sure I understand that, right?

You have a budget, right? And you can allocate that

budget as you see fit. So I think this is kind of

implying that you have to take away from somebody. You

don't necessarily have to take away from anybody to do

that.

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04:12:08 1	You may. If you want to go above guidelines,
04:12:10 2	you may be required to take away from somebody else.
04:12:13 3	But if you stay within guidelines, you are not taking
04:12:16 4	away from anybody.
04:12:19 5	Q. I understand. So increasing one employee's
04:12:23 6	compensation may leave less money there to pay another
04:12:26 7	employee, but it wouldn't take money away from anybody?
04:12:29 8	A. Exactly.
04:12:30 9	Q. Okay. Could you read the next section,
04:12:36 10	section C, and let me know if there is anything in there
04:12:38 11	that you would change to make it more truthful or
04:12:41 12	accurate from your perspective.
04:13:05 13	A. How far down? Sorry.
04:13:07 14	Q. Section C. So through paragraph 31.
04:13:09 15	A. Okay. Perfect.
04:14:57 16	Okay.
04:14:58 17	Q. Is there anything you would change in section C
04:15:00 18	of the Morris declaration to make it more truthful or
04:15:03 19	accurate from your perspective?
04:15:04 20	A. No.
04:15:11 21	Q. How are how does Adobe determine what to pay
04:15:16 22	new hires?
04:15:18 23	A. Adobe doesn't determine what to pay a new hire.
04:15:22 24	We create a salary range that's indicative of what the
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market is for a new hire, and the manager has to

04:15:29 1 determine what it is they want to pay. How is that salary range created? 04:15:31 2 Ο. 04:15:34 3 A. We create that salary range through the process that I described earlier where we are benchmarking 04:15:36 4 specific jobs to the market, and we either adjust them 04:15:41 5 04:15:45 6 up or down based on what the market is telling us by targeting that 65th percentile of the market. 04:15:49 7 Q. Do managers target the midpoint of the range 04:15:53 8 04:15:58 9 for new hires? 04:15:59 10 MR. KIERNAN: Objection. Form. 04:16:01 11 THE WITNESS: Yeah. I don't know what they 04:16:03 12 specifically target. We educate managers that they need 04:16:05 13 to think about a number of things, right? So they need 04:16:09 14 to look at skill level of an individual, the potential 04:16:16 15 expertise that they're bringing to the table, they need 04:16:19 16 to look at kind of what's happening within their overall 04:16:22 17 team, their budget. There is a number of things that 04:16:26 18 managers have to think about when they determine what that amount is going to be. 04:16:28 19 MS. LEEBOVE: Would you please mark this the 04:16:51 20 04:16:53 21 next in order, Exhibit 2496. 04:17:07 22 (Whereupon, Exhibit 2496 was marked for 04:17:07 23 identification.)

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you've been handed Exhibit 2496.

MS. LEEBOVE: Q. Ms. Arriada-Keiper,

It's a -- well, a

04:17:15 1	several-page document that begins on ADOBE_086273
04:17:19 2	and runs through 086276.
04:17:21 3	A. Yes.
04:17:27 4	Q. If you could have a look at it and let me know
04:17:30 5	when you've done so.
04:17:31 6	A. I've seen this.
04:17:32 7	Q. Do you need more time?
04:17:33 8	A. No.
04:17:33 9	Q. Can you tell me what Exhibit 2496 is?
04:17:36 10	A. Yes. It's a template that we use when we need
04:17:38 11	to create a job code and get it entered into SAP.
04:17:45 12	Q. This document says at the top that it was
04:17:47 13	revised in April of '03?
04:17:50 14	A. Okay.
04:17:51 15	Q. And the second page, 086274 says it was revised
04:17:54 16	in April of '02. But have these form have these
04:18:01 17	forms been further revised since those dates?
04:18:04 18	A. I don't know. I'd have to go check with the
04:18:06 19	team. I don't do these anymore.
04:18:10 20	Q. Did you used to use these forms?
04:18:12 21	A. Uh-huh. In my days as a comp analyst, I sure
04:18:15 22	did.
04:18:19 23	Q. So can you walk me through how you would fill
04:18:22 24	this out? How would you know what job code to put in
04:18:24 25	that first line?

05:38:10 1	Q. And is this when you referred to Donna
05:38:15 2	reviewing your proposed salary allocations and well,
05:38:20 3	is this the sort of process that you have her engage in
05:38:23 4	with respect to your reports as well?
05:38:25 5	A. So Donna doesn't typically engage in mine, it's
05:38:29 6	usually Debbie.
05:38:31 7	Q. Oh, I'm sorry.
05:38:32 8	A. No, that's okay.
05:38:33 9	Q. My mistake. I confuse the D names.
05:38:38 10	A. But Debbie doesn't usually get into this level
05:38:42 11	of granularity with me.
05:38:45 12	Q. So are Matt Thompson and Donna Morris peers?
05:38:49 13	A. Yes.
05:38:50 14	Q. So is Matt Thompson free to disregard Donna's
05:38:54 15	proposals or recommendations?
05:38:55 16	A. Yes.
05:38:57 17	Q. Just as any other manager would be free to
05:38:58 18	disregard them?
05:38:59 19	A. Yep.
05:39:00 20	Q. Okay. What do you understand Donna Morris to
05:39:08 21	have been conveying when she said that she had reduced
05:39:12 22	some of the salary adjustments to align with internal
05:39:14 23	equity?
05:39:18 24	A. It's hard for me to speculate what she was

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thinking. But if I were to interpret this, my guess is

05:39:22 she was probably looking at what he had indicated in 1 terms of performance level and contribution, and was 05:39:27 2 05:39:30 3 just making him aware that maybe there was some inconsistencies in terms of the messaging, right? 05:39:33 4 Because, you know, based on the contributions, these 05:39:36 5 05:39:39 6 probably weren't aligning to, you know, what you would 05:39:42 7 expect in terms of recommendation. Q. And so would it be a problem, for instance, 05:39:45 8

here for --

## Is it

- Uh-huh. Α.
- Q. -- to be paid more than a number of Ops Staff employees?

MR. KIERNAN: Objection to form.

THE WITNESS: I don't know if it would be a problem. But again, one of the things he should be considering about is their contribution level. I don't know what he was contributing at or what his performance was, but she probably had some ideas around that.

MS. LEEBOVE: O. So it looks here that Donna Morris was proposing reducing some salary adjustments based on internal equity. Do you know whether managers ever increase salaries to align with internal equity?

I don't know what managers do, no. Managers, Α.

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05:40:35 1	you know, as we've been saying kind of all along, is
05:40:38 2	that internal equity is a factor that they have to
05:40:40 3	consider. So, you know, depending on the individual
05:40:45 4	scenario and the situation, they may make that decision.
05:40:49 5	We ask them to consider internal equity when
05:40:51 6	they're making their salary decisions. That's what
05:40:55 7	she's doing here. And I don't have the full detail
05:41:00 8	here, so it's kind of hard to surmise. But if I had to,
05:41:06 9	again, speculate here, it probably has something to do
05:41:08 10	with the performance level and not being aligned to the
05:41:11 11	recommendations.
05:41:13 12	MS. LEEBOVE: Okay. Well, I do not have any
05:41:17 13	further questions.
05:41:22 14	THE WITNESS: Yay.
05:41:23 15	MS. LEEBOVE: Do you?
05:41:24 16	MR. KIERNAN: (Nonverbal response.)
05:41:24 17	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This is the end of video
05:41:26 18	No. 6 and the conclusion of today's proceeding.
05:41:29 19	The time is 5:41 p.m. We're off the record.
05:41:34 20	(The deposition concluded at 5:41 PM)
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1	I, Gina V. Carbone, Certified Shorthand
2	Reporter licensed in the State of California, License
3	No. 8249, hereby certify that the deponent was by me
4	first duly sworn and the foregoing testimony was
5	reported by me and was thereafter transcribed with
6	computer-aided transcription; that the foregoing is a
7	full, complete, and true record of said proceedings.
8	I further certify that I am not of counsel or
9	attorney for either of any of the parties in the
10	foregoing proceeding and caption named or in any way
11	interested in the outcome of the cause in said caption.
12	The dismantling, unsealing, or unbinding of
13	the original transcript will render the reporter's
14	certificates null and void.
15	In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
16	hand this day: April 10, 2013.
17	X Reading and Signing was requested.
18	Reading and Signing was waived.
19	Reading and signing was not requested.
20	
21	
22	
23	GINA V. CARBONE
24	CSR 8249, CRR, CCRR
25	